One thing that is easy to overlook is that the various theatres of World War II were interconnected in a variety of ways, some obvious and some more subtle. In this time-line, by February 1942 those interconnections have already caused some major shifts in power.

The US is substantially stronger. It is fighting a one-ocean war, without the huge early merchant shipping losses that the U-boats inflicted in our time-line. On the other hand it has a major strategic liability. The Philippines have become politically too important to lose. That forces the United States to pour more power than it really wants to into the battle for the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch East Indies are the key to keeping a trickle of supplies going to the Philippines, and eventually linking back up with the US and Filipino troops holed up on Bataan Peninsula.

In our time-line the US gave the European theatre priority even in the darkest days of 1942, and sent around 150,000 troops there even though the Japanese were still advancing in the Pacific. Most of those men end up in the Pacific theatre in this time-line.

As we saw in part one, without a German declaration of war, the US is able to ramp up production a little faster than it did in our time-line, and get that production to the battlefields much faster.

The British are somewhat weaker at this point than they were in our time-line. As the US Atlantic fleet moves to the Pacific, the British navy is stretched to the limit.

In both time-lines, the US navy had been doing a lot to help get supplies across the Atlantic. In the last half of 1941, the US was essentially fighting an undeclared war against the German navy in the Atlantic. While officially neutral, the US navy escorted convoys across the Atlantic, primarily on the theory that some of the vessels were going to Iceland, which was occupied by US forces. US destroyers shot at and depth-charged U-boats, or shadowed them and radioed their locations to British ships. The U-boats sometimes fought back--torpedoing two US destroyers, one of which sank. Over 100 US sailors died in that attack.

US battleships and aircraft carriers in the Atlantic made it less likely that the still formidable survivors of the German surface fleet would sortie into the Atlantic again like the Bismarck had done earlier in the war. In December 1941, the US had close to half of its destroyers in the Atlantic, 92 destroyers, along with a number of capital ships: battleships and aircraft carriers.

In our time-line some of that assistance went away after Pearl Harbor. The US moved 19 destroyers to the Pacific along with six battleships and three aircraft carriers. Even in the darkest days of early 1942, the US kept a minimum of over 70 destroyers, some battleships and cruisers, and at least one aircraft carrier in the Atlantic, and the number of destroyers actually rose again to 95 by September 1942 as new destroyers were commissioned.

In this time-line much more US power flows into the Pacific in early 1942, as the US finds itself at war with Japan but not Germany. The US navy needs every ship it can muster in the Pacific, and it is politically very difficult for President Roosevelt to keep ships that could help turn the tide in the Pacific out of that conflict. The shift is not total. Even during the darkest days of early 1942 the US keeps at least 40 destroyers in the Atlantic, along with one rather limited aircraft carrier (the Ranger), an old battleship and a few cruisers.

Britain finds itself with more naval commitments in the Atlantic, and with a substantially lower level of Lend-Lease from the United States. US forces get priority on US shipping and on new US tanks and planes. The shift in US priorities really starts to pinch Britain in the early part of 1942. The Germans have increased the number of submarines operating in the Atlantic drastically, and they have finally ironed out the last few bugs in their torpedoes. British shipping, as opposed to US shipping is really taking a beating. Ultimately though, there is a limit to the impact that the U-boats can have. US shipping is still intact in this time-line, and while the British don't get top priority, the US is not going to let Britain be strangled by the U-boats while the US has ample shipping available.

The British shipping shortage translates to a temporary halt in convoys to the Soviet Union. The British simply can't afford that commitment in the first half of 1942.

One plus for both Allies is that they don't face the severe shortage of oil tankers that German attacks on US shipping caused in early 1942 in our time-line. That has a major impact because the shortage of oil tankers in our time was a major constraint on Allied actions in the first year or two of the war.

The Germans find the going in the Atlantic considerably easier without having to fight the US fleet. They are also able to increase the percentage of their forces fighting the Soviet Union modestly in the spring of 1942. That, plus the halt to Allied convoys to the Soviet Union, translates into a slightly faster German advance in the east in the summer of 1942. In our time-line, the British tied down considerable German ground, air, and even submarine forces by convincing Hitler that the Allies were about to invade Norway in early 1942. Without the US in the war, that bluff is simply not credible even to Hitler, and the German forces are used elsewhere.

Part one followed the course of battles in the Pacific through the first few months of 1942. The Japanese have found the Philippines a somewhat tougher nut to crack than they did in our time-line, but they have cornered US and Filipino forces in the Bataan Peninsula, just as they did in our time-line. It just takes a week or two longer. The Japanese invasion of Malaya goes on pretty much as scheduled. The two British capital ships Repulse and Prince of Wales would probably not have met exactly the same fate at exactly the same time that they did in our time-line. There was a considerable element of chance to the exact timing of their sinking. On the hand, those ships were eventually doomed if they continued to try to intervene in the Malayan fighting, so even if they survived another couple of days they would have still been sunk and still signaled the end of the battleship as the primary naval weapon. Ironically British losses at Singapore are significantly less than in our time-line because the British shipping situation is more strained and the British aren't able to pour as much manpower into that losing cause as quickly. The manpower that isn't lost at Singapore eventually goes partly into shoring up the defense of Burma and partly into building up the Allied position in the East Indies.

In this time-line, a major battle has shaped up for the Dutch East Indies island of Java. By the time the Japanese land in early March (a week or two later than in our time-line), the US has a marine brigade there to supplement Dutch forces and small units of British troops.

Both sides build up their forces as the battle for Java rages through March 1942. The Japanese have a major advantage in the air and a much larger and more effective surface fleet in the area. However, the Japanese fleet carriers have not yet been drawn into the battle. Neither have the US carriers. Neither side wants to commit major forces of capital ships to the fighting while the other side's fleet remains a threat. The sea battle is between destroyers and cruisers of the two sides, with land-based fighters playing a role.

American pilots flying P40 fighters on Java don't have to face the dreaded Japanese Zero just yet, though Japanese army fighters are only a little less capable. The much-touted US B17s have a trivial impact on the early fighting. Japanese bombers have a much greater impact. The Japanese bomber pilots are extremely accurate. Allied air forces have a constant struggle to avoid being caught on the ground and destroyed.

As March ends and April begins, the battle for Java brings a steady and disheartening flow of US and Dutch casualties, planes lost and ships lost. The Japanese are better trained and more experienced at war after their long years of fighting in China. Dutch forces are large, but of variable quality. Many units with large native contingents simply disintegrate when the fighting starts. Others fight well. The US Marines are very tough. The Japanese can't match their firepower, and their limited supply of light M3 tanks are devastating to the Japanese.

The stream of bad news is counterbalanced by the fact that the Japanese are suffering casualties too. Japanese pilots are crashing and dying-not in as large a numbers as US and Dutch pilots, but in considerable numbers. That's important because Japanese air power is built on a relatively small number of very highly trained pilots. There are nowhere near enough pilots in the training pipe-line to replace the ones being lost over Java, and training pilots to the standards of the ones the Japanese are losing will take over 4 years (versus a year and a half for a US pilot). Japanese air power is not sustainable in a war of attrition with a country like the US. Initially the attrition involves Japanese army pilots rather than naval ones, but the same principle applies to the navy too. The US can afford to trade pilot for pilot, or even two pilots for one pilot. The Japanese lose if they play that game.

The Japanese do have a major advantage in that their supply lines to Java are much shorter and somewhat more secure. The fall of Singapore allows the Japanese to threaten Allied supply lines to Java. The Allies have built up ground and air forces in the Dutch part of Timor to partially offset that threat. They are also building up in New Guinea to the extent the primitive logistics of that island allows.

Control of the seas is ultimately going to decide the fate of the fighting in Java. Both sides have large bodies of potential reinforcements that could enter that fighting. The US is building up in Australia, while the Japanese are reluctantly moving forces that were earmarked for Burma into the Java area, along with some forces from China.

The carriers haven't clashed yet, and until they do the war in the Pacific is still in the early rounds. The Japanese want to lure the US carriers out and kill them, then use control of the seas to cut off US reinforcements to the area. The US navy is also looking for a fight. In late April and early May both navies get their wish in a series of indecisive carrier battles. There is no clear US triumph like our time-line's battle of Midway. That was a matter of luck and split-second timing that is unlikely to occur in any other set of circumstances. On the other hand there is also no comparable Japanese triumph. Both sides lose ships, planes, and pilots. The Japanese emerge with somewhat of an edge in number of casualties inflicted, but the US can repair ships and replace pilots a lot quicker than the Japanese, so draws ultimately favor the US, at least in terms of naval power.

Draws don't lead to a US rescue of the garrison of the Philippines, and that is becoming politically more necessary all the time. By the end of April 1942, the Japanese are still avoiding a major offensive against that garrison. The troops that would make that offensive possible are in Java. At the same time, the Bataan garrison is slowly strangling, in spite of the best efforts of blockade runners who sometimes manage to sneak through the area dominated by the Japanese navy and get small amounts of supplies to the besieged forces. Submarines also get small amounts of crucial supplies to the garrison, and even B17s are pressed into service to airdrop supplies.

The fact that US and Filipino forces are still holding out is actually becoming somewhat of a political headache for Roosevelt. He doesn't want to lose the battle for the Philippines, but until the US can defeat the Japanese navy or win the battle for Java there doesn't seem to be any way to rescue the trapped garrison, and Roosevelt really doesn't want to see the Philippines fall to the Japanese in August or September of 1942, just in time for the mid-term elections. That seems like a real possibility in late May of 1942.

By late May, the tide of battle has definitely turned against the Japanese in Java. The US is pouring planes, tanks, and men into the area. M3 light tanks are a handful for the Japanese to deal with, and now they are starting to run into the more powerful Lee/Grant medium tanks. The usefulness of US light tanks in the Pacific theatre actually slows down the development of US armor somewhat. Light tanks are adequate against the Japanese and they are easy to ship, so production flows to them to some extent and away from medium tanks, in spite of British experience in North Africa which shows that the light tanks have little combat role in a European context.

The US is also beginning to gain air superiority, as Japanese pilot quality declines and US pilots learn not to get into dogfights with the lighter and more agile Japanese fighters. US forces are getting better every week, while the Japanese are actually declining as veteran pilots are killed and less highly trained replacements come on line.

As a sidelight, the fact that Java is holding out means Dutch forces actually start using light Marmon-Herrington tanks that they ordered before the US entered the war. Those tanks prove grossly inadequate even against the Japanese, but the Dutch are reluctant to admit that they made a mistake in ordering them, so they soldier on among the Dutch forces long after they have been proven nearly useless.

And that's when I ran out of time. In part three I'll look at how things are going in North Africa and on the Eastern Front. How much power has Hitler been able to shift to the eastern front? Do any extra divisions he shifts there make a difference, or do they simply feed more bodies into the Stalingrad fiasco? Will the British be able to hold off Rommel in North Africa in mid-1942? If they can, will they be able to inflict a decisive defeat on him in late 1942 like they did in our time-line? What will the fate of French North Africa and Vichy France be? How are the Soviets reacting to the temporary end of western aid to them? How much is that cutoff actually hurting them? How does the emphasis on the Pacific change the structure of US forces and production? It has already changed the structure of US tank production. How much will the emphasis shift away from land forces and toward more shipbuilding? How capable will the US be of fighting a European war if and when it has to? Hopefully I'll get to those questions next issue.