The Rif War
One
of the lesser known 20th
century wars gets an Alternate History
Review:
Sky People
A
Polish Zero?
The
Poles
develop a fast, maneuverable fighter comparable to the Japanese Zero in
the late 1930s.
Point Of Divergence
is an
amateur press
magazine and also a forum for discussing AH and AH-related
ideas. Here is my comment section.
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What
actually happened:
Poland had many of the same problems and strengths that Japan
had.
The Poles faced enemies with overwhelming industrial might, just as
the Japanese did. Both the Poles and the Japanese had been
able
to rearm more freely than their enemies in the early
thirties.
As a result, both the Poles and the Japanese had small corps of
extremely skillful pilots. Unfortunately for the Poles, the
similarity between the airforces ended there. The Japanese
developed world-class light-weight fighters like the Zero.
The
Poles designed very good gull-wing fighters in the early 1930s, but
their efforts to build a low-wing monoplane fighter comparable to the
ME109 or the British Spitfire faltered, and was still at prototype
stage when the Germans invaded.
What if
the Poles had been able to build a plane comparable to the Zero
and get a couple hundred produced before the German invasion?
A
Zero-like plane with its extreme maneuverability and skimpy pilot
protection would have probably suited Polish pilots well.
With
a decent fighter to produce, the Poles could have probably produced
150 to 200 of the new fighter before the German invasion.
That
would let them replace the old PZL-7s. they were still flying
historically, but not all of the PZL-11s.
So
what kind of an impact would a zero-like fighter have on the German
invasion? Well, contrary to popular myth, the German
historically didn’t catch the Polish airforce on the ground,
though they tried to. The Poles fought hard, but their
fastest
fighters couldn’t catch most German bombers, and German
fighters were a generation ahead of the Poles. The German
command of the air was devastating to the Poles, keeping them from
finishing their mobilization, destroying strong-points and
communication centers, and forcing the Poles to move only at
night.
In this scenario, the Germans
would have a lot more trouble controlling the air until they adapted
their tactics or the Poles ran out of planes and bullets. The
Poles couldn’t be everywhere but when they appeared they would
shoot down German fighters almost at will if those fighters didn’t
run and leave the bombers they were accompanying to their
fates.
Historically, British Spitfires flown by pilots hardened by the
Battle of Britain were trivially easy for the Japanese Zeros to shoot
down in early 1942. Given very good Polish pilots and a
similar
plane, the Poles could have probably done the same thing to Me109s
and 110s.
On the other hand, the Poles didn’t
have radar, and their early warning system was primitive. A
couple hundred good fighters could not cover the entire country, and
it would be difficult to concentrate them where they were needed the
most. They would also be outnumbered by five or ten to one in
any given area. It would be an odd air campaign, with the
Germans dominating the air except where the Polish airforce showed
up, but forced to flee for their lives when the Poles did show
up.
Without fighter protection, Stukas would
be
deathtraps, and would probably be forced to curtail their
activities. Level bombers wouldn’t have anywhere near the
accuracy that the dive bombers had, so German air
effectiveness
would drop drastically if the Stukas became unusable.
The Stukas were a key part of German operations in the early part of
the war. They could take out key strong points that would
have
otherwise forced the Germans to wait for their heavy artillery to
come up, slowing down the pace of the advance. Taking them
out
of the equation would have meant a much slower German advance in
Poland.
Now where would that take us?
Historically, the French appear to have essentially written the Poles
off a week to ten days into the war. In this scenario it
would
be more difficult fore the western Allies to write off the Poles and
crawl back behind the Maginot line.
Unfortunately, the western Allies probably weren’t capable of
an offensive that would really threaten Germany in a reasonable
period of time, though. The French and the British simply
didn’t have the type of armies that could move fast and far
against even fairly weak German opposition. They would
probably
take some additional territory, but unless the Poles held out for
several months vital German territory wouldn’t be threatened
from the west.
That leaves the Poles pretty
much on their own for a couple of months. Unfortunately for
them, their ammunition supply would probably not be up to holding out
too much longer than that. The western Allies did have some
supplies in the pipeline, headed through Romania, but the Poles would
have run low on ammunition fairly quickly. Fortunately, so
would the Germans.
The Germans actually ran low
on bombs during the historic Polish campaign, so they would have
certainly faced shortages in a prolonged war. The German war
machine was geared to short campaigns, with a lot of tanks, planes
and artillery produced, but not a lot of ammunition or spare parts to
keep them in the field. The Germans would have probably had
to
slow the pace of the fighting within a couple of months due to supply
shortages. They would have also run short of some categories
of
oil. Their stockpiles were not large enough for a prolonged
war, and they didn’t have access to Romanian or Soviet oil
during the Polish campaign. Synthetic oil plants couldn’t
make up the difference in 1939 because a lot of the plants weren’t
on line yet.
Would the Soviets join the war as
they did historically? They might eventually, but not as
early
as they did historically. The Soviets weren’t prepared
for the speed of the historic German advance, and had to put together
a hasty offensive that they probably wouldn’t have tried
against a more intact Polish army. The Soviets also had the
Japanese to worry about. They had just beaten the Japanese in
a
major border clash at Nomanham, but the issue wasn’t totally
settled yet.
Given a slower German advance in
Poland, the Soviets might have tried to make the Japanese pay a
higher price in the long-standing rivalry along the Manchurian
border. It would have been an ideal time for the Soviets to
deal with the Japanese in Manchuria. With the Germans and
Poles
tied up fighting each other, the Soviets could have fought the
Japanese with no immediate fear of having to deal with a second front
in the west. The Soviets wanted to knock the Japanese out of
Manchuria eventually. They had just dealt the Japanese a
crushing defeat. Would they have followed up on a larger
scale
if the Germans appeared stalled in Poland? An all-out
offensive
is probably a long shot. The Soviets tended to be
cautious—chess players rather than kamikazes. At the same
time, this would have been an ideal time to deal with an old enemy,
so the Soviets might have at least tried to further humiliate the
Japanese and seize some additional territory.
So what would the ultimate result of all of this be? The
Poles
would eventually run out of ‘zeros’, no matter how good
of a kill ratio they had. The western allies would
undoubtedly
ship them some additional planes, such as the French Morane Saulner
MS406s that the Poles historically had on order, but the MS406 would
not be a giant killer like the ‘zero’ My guess is
that the Poles would hold out until late December 1939 or January
1940, with the Germans forced to pause for around a month in late
October and early November to replenish their logistics. The
Soviets would come in and grab their spoils only when it was obvious
that the Poles were about to fold. That would probably mean
no
Soviet Winter War against Finland, which means that the Soviet Army
would not discover how bad most of its divisions actually were until
later.
By the time the Poles folded, the
western Allies would have advanced quite a bit further into German
territory, but not decisively so. Their offensives would be
essentially an improved version of a World War I offensive, with
objectives measured in miles or the low tens of miles at the
most.
The French army would get some additional combat experience and shake
out some of the worst of the dead wood. The Germans probably
wouldn’t have to pull significant forces away from the Polish
front.
How long would it take for the Germans
to attack in the West after Poland fell? Historically, the
German army wasn’t ready for an offensive in the west until
January of 1940, three months after the bulk of the Polish fighting
was over. Given a more prolonged Polish resistance, they
probably wouldn’t be ready to attack France for at least four
months. That would mean that they would be hard-pressed to be
ready in time for the excellent blitzkrieg weather in mid-May
1940.
They would probably also be hard-pressed to get the Luftwaffe back in
shape to take part in that offensive. The Germans didn’t
have an unlimited supply of planes or pilots, and the Luftwaffe would
have lost far more of both in the Polish campaign than they did
historically.
Would the Germans still win in
the west? Every month they delayed would mean that the
western
Allies got stronger, especially in the air. Historically, the
French were shifting from the MS 406 to the much-superior Dewoitine
520 when the German attack came, one of the reasons why not all of
their fighter squadrons were available when the attack came.
Any German delay would have also risk running into bad
weather.
Western Europe doesn’t have a lot of months of good flying
weather, and the Luftwaffe of 1940 was definitely a fair weather
airforce.
At this point, I probably need to cut
this short lest it grow past the mini-scenario stage.
Revised
Version - Posted
on Feb 3, 2012.
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