Brainstorming Scenario

Hitler Doesn't Declare War On the US After Pearl Harbor

In the short term he loses out big-time. In the long-term, well-we'll see.

By: Dale R. Cozort

Every so often I like to take a fairly standard what-if and see if I can provide any new insight on it. I actually started out with two scenarios here, but I realized that while neither one of them really made too much sense alone they made perfect sense together. The first scenario had the US airforce in the Philippines striking at the Japanese airbases in Taiwan shortly after they received word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor rather than dithering for several hours and then having the core of their airforce caught on the ground. That one didn't work well because it didn't have that much long-term impact in and of itself. The second scenario had Hitler deciding not to declare war on the US after Pearl Harbor. The problem with that scenario is that as we will see in a bit, Hitler had a lot of very good reasons to declare war on the US at a time when a goodly amount of US naval power was tied up against Japan. I decided to combined the two scenarios, with the US success in the Philippines causing Hitler not to declare war on the US. I'll develop that more later.

What actually happened: Hitler encouraged the Japanese to move against the United States not as part of some overall Axis grand design, but primarily to shift America's main focus to the Pacific long enough for the Germans to knock the Soviet Union out of the war and consolidate power in Europe. He declared war on the United States because:

1. He didn't realize how quickly and to what extent the US could mobilize industry and train large armies.

2. It gave the German navy a great deal more freedom to go after US shipping.

3. Least important, he had essentially promised the Japanese that he would.

What might have happened: Instead of getting caught on the ground, the US airforce launches a heavy raid on Japanese airbases on the Philippines. As in our time-line, the Japanese have not been able to take off yet for their intended raid on the Philippines because of ground fog. The US raid is moderately successful. It destroys 20 to 25 Japanese warplanes on the ground, damages a few more, kills some pilots in their planes, and causes enough damage to the bases to delay any immediate Japanese counter-attack.

US pilots think they've done a lot more damage than they have, and their reports are further exaggerated by the Roosevelt administration, which bills their attack as payback for Pearl Harbor. Hitler isn't so much fooled by the US account of the attack as made more cautious by them. It brings back memories of the pre-war expectations of Italian military performance, and mixes with his racism to create enough doubt as to whether or not the "little yellow men" can take on a real Great Power that he decides to await further developments--to see if the Japanese are capable of taking on the US.

During the over two years between the start of the war and Pearl Harbor, Hitler had been very careful to avoid any incident that would allow Roosevelt to get the US into the war. He wasn't totally unaware of the potential power of the US, though he did underestimate the amount of time it would take for that power to be mobilized. As December 1941 wears on Hitler becomes aware of the scope of the Soviet winter offensive. He also becomes upset because the Japanese didn't warn him that the Soviets were pulling large numbers of experienced divisions out of the Soviet Far East for that Soviet winter offensive, even though the Japanese knew it was happening. As December goes on, Hitler decides that any war with the US should wait until the crisis on the eastern front has eased, and until the Japanese have done more to prove themselves against the US.

The US also becomes more anxious to avoid war with Germany as December goes on. Roosevelt still considers Germany the main enemy, but the Japanese are proving unexpectedly strong, and fighting the Germans at the same time doesn't seem like as great of an idea as it did before the fighting with Japan started. The US becomes a little less aggressive in the Atlantic, at least for a few months. That makes the issue of war with the United States a little less pressing for Hitler.

So the Germans and Italians decide to wait a while before declaring war on the US. The consequences of that are on balance very negative for the Axis through about the middle of 1942. After that the balance of consequences may swing toward the Axis, depending on how much advantage the US takes advantage of their enhanced opportunities in the Pacific.

Philippines Chronology (our time-line)

December 8, 1941 – Japanese air raid destroys half of the modern US aircraft in the Philippines: 18 B17’s and 53 P40’s, along with 35 older aircraft. (Japan loses 7 fighters)

Dec 12- Dec 13, 1941 – US air power in Philippines essentially finished.

December 22, 1941 – Main Japanese landing on Luzon.

December 25, 1941 – What was left of the US Far East Fleet evacuated the Philippines (with a few exceptions).

January 6, 1942 – US & Philippine forces driven back into Bataan peninsula.

February 8, 1942 – Japanese forced to break off attack on Allied positions in Bataan and withdraw to defensive positions.

March 12, 1942 – General MacArthur is evacuated.

April 2, 1942 Japanese resume offensive.

April 9, 1942 - US forces on Bataan surrender. Island fortress of Corregidor holds out.

May 6, 1942 – Corregidor surrenders.

May 9, 1942 – Last organized US & Filipino units surrender, though many individuals fight on as guerrillas.

 

No German declaration of war has immediate negative consequences for Germany. The Germans can't take advantage of the temporary US naval weakness to devastate US shipping. That means that larger amounts of shipping are available to move war materials to Britain and to some extent the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it becomes politically much more difficult for the US to send war materials to the European Allies and especially the Soviet Union. American soldiers are besieged in the Philippines, fighting with inadequate weapons, little food and without vitally needed medicine. It is difficult to justify sending weapons to people fighting enemies we aren't even at war with while we are at risk of losing battles in Asia.

The German decision makes attempting to link back up with American forces in the Philippines much more politically necessary to the US. In order to do that, the US has to shift shipping and munitions from the Atlantic to build up forces to defend the Dutch East Indies and hopefully Malaya and Singapore. If they can do that, they can then build up air and sea power in the area, then go on the offensive. The US has been running the Japanese blockade of the Philippines on a small scale at night. More shipping available could translate into more supplies for the Philippines, prolonging resistance there.

Roosevelt doesn't really want to give rescuing forces in the Philippines top priority, and the navy is even less enthusiastic about doing so. Without a German declaration of war it becomes politically much harder not to, especially after the Roosevelt administration's trumpeting of the initial US victory. Also, if the US is more aggressive in the Pacific that may allow the British to shift forces from the Far East to the Middle East, or at least not be forced to shift forces to the Far East.

In our time-line, the German U-boats devastated unescorted US shipping in late 1941 and through July or August of 1942, making it much more difficult for the US to translate rapidly increasing arms production into military power. In our time-line, through at least mid-1943 shortages of shipping was a constant constraint on US and British options. The U-boats sunk over 400 ships totaling over 2 million tons before the US got its act together and instituted effective convoy systems by August 1942. Peter Padfield, in his book "War Beneath the Sea" calls these losses "a disaster of infinitely greater magnitude than the more dramatic loss of slow ageing battleships from the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor..." Padfield goes on to call "the loss of raw materials and the setback to production incalculable."

Roosevelt still considers Hitler the main enemy, and is somewhat disappointed that the Germans haven't declared war. At the same time, forces built up for the war against Japan will eventually be usable against Germany to some extent, and certainly the US will be in much better position to fight Germany if Japan has been defeated or at least forced on the defensive. There is another advantage to going all-out against Japan early. If the US moves substantial naval power from the Atlantic to the Pacific it may make the temptation to strike at US shipping overwhelming for the Germans.

So without a German declaration of war, the US is able to ramp up production a little faster than it did in our time-line, and get that production to the battlefields much faster. It is also able to shift significant naval power from the Atlantic to the Pacific, primarily cruisers and destroyers. That transfer takes some time, but by mid-January the impact is being felt in Pacific battlefields.

The course of events on those Pacific battlefields has not diverged too far from our time-line so far. The Japanese invasion of Malaya goes on pretty much as scheduled. In the Philippines, it takes the Japanese about twelve days longer to establish air superiority and chase the US Asiatic Fleet out of the Philippines. 

British Defeats (Our time-line)

Dec 11,1941 – May 20, 1942 – Japanese take Burma.  

Dec7, 1941- Feb 15, 1942 – Japanese take Malaya & Singapore.

They lose a few more pilots in the process, but by December 24, 1941 the remaining US planes give up challenging the Japanese in the air and are either transferred south in the case of the surviving B17s or are reserved for reconnaissance in the case of the surviving P40 fighters.  The remnants of the US Asiatic Fleet pull out on New Years Eve and heads to Java.  

The main Japanese invasion of Luzon is delayed just one week-to December 29. The extra week isn't enough to make a great deal of difference in terms of making the Philippines more defensible. Much of the Philippine portion of the army has only 3 months worth of training, so the extra week helps a little, but not enough to make much difference. The Japanese have somewhat less airpower to throw into the battle, and have to worry a bit more about US submarine attacks on their transports. The US is able to get a small amount of additional supplies into the Philippines before the Japanese are able to impose a blockade.

It takes the Japanese 20 days to drive the US/Philippine forces back into the Bataan peninsula rather than the 15 it took in our time-line. That brings it to January 18 rather than January 6, 1942. Now the Japanese have to make a choice. In our time-line they moved up the time-table for capturing Java by a month by moving the best units from the Philippines south. That made the conquest of the Philippines a much longer and more difficult process, but did make the conquest of the Dutch East Indies much quicker. They make the same choice in this time-line, but the forces become available almost two weeks later than in our time-line.

The Japanese attacks on the East Indies are delayed by a week at some points and two weeks at others. That is just enough time for the impact of more Allied shipping availability and naval power shifted from the Atlantic to start to be felt. As the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies starts, the US starts to weigh in. In our time-line some US cruisers and destroyers participated in the defense of the Dutch colony, but no American land forces. In this time-line, the US is able to add considerably more sea power, a marine brigade, and land-based fighters to a buildup that Roosevelt hopes will deny Japan access to the East Indies oil fields and set the stage for linking up with US forces in the Philippines.

Increased US power compounds itself. In our time-line, lack of enough destroyer escorts made it easier for Japanese submarines to take out larger American warships. For example, a Japanese submarine  torpedoed and sank an old US seaplane carrier that was ferrying

East Indies Chronology (Our Time-line)

Dec 15, 1941-Jan 19, 1942 – Japanese seize British Borneo

Jan 11-28, 1942 – Japanese seize Dutch Borneo.

Jan 11-Feb 9, 1942 – Japanese take Celebes.

Feb 14-15, 1942 – Bitter fighting in Sumatra, Dutch withdraw.

Feb 27, 1942 – Allies lose the Naval Battle of Java Sea.

Feb 28-March 8 – Japanese take Java

thirty-five P40 fighters to help defend Java. In this time-line, a stronger destroyer escort foils that attack, and the P40's become operational over Java.

That in turn makes the task of the fleet defending the East Indies a little more doable--especially as more US fighters join those first few. In our time-line the Japanese had undisputed control of the air around Java, and used it to destroy the small Dutch and American fleets in the area. In this time-line, the Japanese still win the initial battles in the area, and land in Java. The US actually loses more ships and men than they did in our time-line, but it has a lot more ships to lose than it did in our time-line. The Japanese lose more ships than in our time-line too, along with scarce pilots and destroyer crews. The battle for Java turns into something resembling the battle for Guadalcanal-with both sides building up and fighting a war of attrition on the land and the sea and air around it.

The US has a lot more to learn about fighting a naval war than the Japanese do, and initially loses a series of lopsided battles in the seas around Java, but as in our time-line the Americans learn fast, and they manage to do some damage too. The Marines are tough and well-trained, and they give the Japanese an unpleasant taste of what they are going to be up against as more American troops enter the fighting. The US is also fighting an ongoing small-scale campaign to sneak supplies into the Philippines.

There has been little impact on fighting in North Africa or in the Soviet Union. The increased shipping available comes very close to counterbalancing the increased American commitment to the Pacific through about mid-1942. After that though, Germany starts to get stronger compared to our time-line. Without the US buildup in Britain, Germany can concentrate a larger percentage of its forces against the Soviet Union in the second half of 1942. Also, there is little reason for the Germans to allocate scarce manpower to building the "Atlantic Wall" defenses. That eases a bottleneck in the German economy and translates into higher production of tanks, artillery, and aircraft.

Without the American bomber offensive, Germany has more planes and more flak guns for the Russian front. That starts out as a relatively small difference, but gradually grows more important as the second half of 1942 wears on.

Also, the Germans do find a use for the submarines that in our time-line were devastating US shipping. The British find the going a bit tougher in the Atlantic as the US withdraws naval power to fight in the Pacific. The British have been fighting the naval war for over two years though, and they have an effective convoy system in place. They lose more ships than in our time-line, but nowhere near the amounts that the US would have.

And that's when I ran out of time. So where does this go from here? Do the Japanese take the East Indies anyway? Do the Soviets still hold out through 1942? Obviously if a battle of Midway happens it won't happen exactly the way it happened in our time-line. What are the consequences of that? What happens in 1943 and 1944 as the Soviets continue to face close to the entire might of the Germans? Does the US eventually enter the war against Germany?

 

 

 Comments are very welcome.

 


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Copyright 2001 By Dale R. Cozort


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