This essay covers only the period of active hostilities between a loose, alliance of Japan and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Western Allies on the other. It is true that Soviet and Japanese remnants fought on for several more years after the fall of the Japanese home islands in late 1946 and even after the Western capture of the Urals industrial areas in July 1948. The fighting after July 1948 was bitter, bloody, and sometimes involved armor, especially in the hands of the western allies. It was, however, primarily a war of small units and guerrilla actions. It also merged almost seamlessly with the wars between the various Soviet successor states.

While both the Soviets and the western allies designed innovative and effective tanks in 1947 and early 1948, the role of the tank changed with the advent of widespread battlefield use of atomic weapons, and the tanks of the atomic era deserve a separate treatment.

 

The military and political background:

The question of why Stalin turned on the western allies in June of 1945 will probably never be answered with certainty. Captured Soviet archives give some clues, but one-man nature of Stalin’s rule makes any conclusion very difficult. Was it simply his way of taking advantage of a window of opportunity? Was his motivation fear of how the west would respond to the April 1945 discovery of Soviet spies in the US atomic weapons program? The US government kept that discovery quiet, but it did put a chill in Soviet/US relationships. Did he fear that the US intended to use the imminent success of that program to deny the Soviet Union the fruits of its victory in World War II? Did he feel betrayed and threatened by the fact that many Soviet POWs in allied hands were not being returned as quickly as promised? He did blame the west for the escape of renegade Soviet general Vlasov and many of his top aides through western lines to Switzerland. The escape of Vlasov and western reluctance to turn over Soviet POWs was the result of the general chill in the relationship, not part of a western plot to eventually use those men against Stalin. Did Stalin know that though? Was the Soviet attack simply the act of a man increasingly divorced from reality? All of those motivations are possible but unprovable. All we know for certain is that Stalin ordered the Red Army to head west in June 1945, and it headed west.

The Soviets advanced into a partial vacuum in terms of military and political power. Germany was defeated, disarmed and occupied. Britain was militarily strong but financially a basket case, dependent on the American Lend-Lease money. France was frantically trying to rebuild its military and economic power. In June 1945, it was still a minor power though. It had a little over a dozen well-equipped divisions. The rest of its army consisted of half a million former resistance fighters—capable of fighting German stragglers but not well armed Soviet troops. Many of those ex-resistance fighters had to be treated as somewhat suspect after the Soviet attack anyway, due to their ties with the French communist party.

American power in Europe reached its zenith around April of 1945. Even before the final surrender of Germany, the US was already focusing more and more of its energies toward the defeat of Japan. Stalin’s surprise attack on the Western Allies in June 1945 drew some American power back into Europe, but the US never participated as whole-heartedly in the campaign to push back the Soviet Union as it had in the campaign against the Nazis. The sudden betrayal reawakened the voices of isolationism in the United States. Many Americans looked back to the end of World War I and concluded that once again the US had been duped into helping one morally equivalent side against another.

The attack also put a considerable number of Americans who admired the Soviet Union either as a social system or as a fighting ally in an awkward position. Many people in England and France suffered from that same ambivalence, but they had a more immediate stake in the outcome. As refugees flowed from Germany with stories of massacres, Western European support for the Soviet Union dwindled to a core of activists—dangerous but not fatal to the western war effort.

The armies and their tanks (June 1945) — Western Allies:

In June 1945, all of the western allies had armored forces built around the US-built Sherman tank. Smaller numbers of other tanks supplemented the Sherman, but they were an exotic sprinkling on forces built around the Sherman. The US built nearly 50,000 Shermans through June 1945. By June 1945, that production was trailing off. Several production lines had already been shut down, or switched over to production of the new Pershings. The Sherman tank had evolved a great deal since it’s first appearance in 1942, and even since June 1944, when it had so much trouble knocking out German Panthers and Tigers. Older model Shermans with their medium-velocity 75-mm guns were still around, but newer models with more powerful main armament and improved suspension were becoming the norm.

US armor units in June1945: In June 1945, over half of US Shermans had 76 mm guns--still inadequate but much less so than the lower velocity 75 mm guns. New tungsten-cored High Velocity Armor Piercing (HVAP) ammunition for the 76mm gun was becoming more common, but US tankers still looked enviously at British units equipped with the Sherman Firefly. The Firefly’s 17-pounder made even the 76mm gun look inadequate. Some US units attempted to covertly re-equip with Firefly’s. There is no definitive evidence that any of them succeeded before June 1945, though there are hints that a few did. Unofficial re-equipment with Fireflys definitely happened after Stalin moved west, and complicated US logistics to some extent.

A few US armored units had re-equipped with M26 Pershings. Around 1400 Pershings had been produced by mid-June 1945, but only 300 had reached European units. The Pershing used a reasonably powerful and accurate 90-mm gun—roughly equal to the 88mm gun in the original German Tiger tank. The Americans also had thousands of "tank destroyers"—lightly armored vehicles that relied on speed and a high velocity gun to hunt down tanks. In 1945, those high velocity guns were the 76mm from the Sherman or the 90mm gun from the Pershing, with new vehicles getting 90-mm guns. The newer tank destroyers were more common than Pershings in Europe in June 1945, and found themselves in heavy demand as US troops faced the Soviet heavy tanks.

In 1945, some American units were equipped with the war’s best light tank—the M24 Chaffee. It was a good recon vehicle but was no match for even a T34/85, much less a Joseph Stalin 3.

British armor units in June 1945: Ironically, British units had better Shermans than the US. By June 1945, most British armored units had a high percentage of Sherman Fireflies—a British modification that put the excellent British 17-pounder anti-tank gun into a Sherman turret. Ironically, those Shermans were the only 17-pounder armed tank the British got to their units in any major quantity by June 1945. The British did also have a few hundred Comets with a slightly lighter version of that gun, and a handful of excellent Centurion tanks, initially armed with the 17-pounder, but slated for heavier armament when it became available.

A large percentage of British units still were armed with 75 mm gun tanks—Cromwells, Churchills, and early model Shermans. A few British units had American-built tank destroyers—M36’s and Hellcats.

French armor units in June 1945: The French were armed mainly with American-made Shermans. Most of those Shermans were still armed with the 75-mm gun. A few French units had more exotic armor—some were equipped with captured German Panthers, while a few had cast-off British tanks armed with 6-pounder (57mm) guns. Ex-resistance fighters were armed with whatever they could get their hands on, including recaptured French pre-1940 tanks like the B1, the H39, and the Somua S35, improvised vehicles built on French ammunition carriers, and even a few World War I-era Renault FT-17s.

Italian armored units in June 1945: After the Italian surrender in 1943, the allies had slowly allowed the Italians to rebuild their army. That rebuilding was primarily a British task. Italian armor in June 1945 was mostly British, or American Lend-lease tanks that become obsolete by British standards. Those tanks were supplemented by a few Italian-built Semovente guns. A few reasonably modern Italian-built medium tanks survived the war, but not enough to equip sizable units. The best Italian-built tank, the P26/40 medium tank was equivalent to an early model Sherman. A few captured German tanks were pressed into service, but few spare parts were available for those vehicles.

The Italian army had 6 good British equipped and trained divisions in June 1945, along with several divisions armed with Italian equipment. The Allies re-equipped several more divisions before Italy became a battlefield in August 1945.

Other allies: There was a sizable Polish exile army in June 1945, along with Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian, and even Czech units. Their equipment was indistinguishable from that of the sponsoring power—Britain or the US.

 

The armies and their tanks (June 1945)—The Soviets:

Soviet armor was built around the T34/85 medium tank, just as allied armor was built around the Sherman. The T34/85 was a good tank. It had a more powerful main gun than the 75mm gun or the 76mm gun Shermans, though that gun was not as powerful as the British 17-pounder and was arguably somewhat less capable than the 90 mm gun of the Pershing and some US tank destroyers.

The T34/85 was supplemented by the survivors of nearly 4000 Soviet JS-2 tanks which were produced before June 1945, and a couple of hundred JS-3’s which were starting to enter service with the Soviet army. Both JS series heavy tanks carried an extremely powerful, though slow-firing 122mm gun and were heavily enough armored that even the original German Tigers had trouble knocking them out from the front at long range. The Soviets also built over 4000 SP guns based on the JS-series chassis.

In the early days of the Soviet offensive, those heavy tanks seemed almost unstoppable. They played a major role in initial Soviet successes. Except for Sherman Fireflys and Shermans with 76mm guns and HVAP ammunition, Sherman tanks had very little chance of knocking out a JS-2 or JS-3 in the initial stages of the war.

The Soviets also had a few new T44 medium tanks, a type that became more common as 1945 went on. The initial batch of T44 had essentially the same 85-mm gun as the T34/85. The Soviets also still had a few older tanks like Bt-7s and KV-1s on inventory. Ironically, the Soviets also had a large number of Lend-lease Shermans—the survivors of over 4000 Shermans shipped to the Soviet Union. They also had some older model British tanks.

The Soviets also relied heavily on heavily armored, simple-to-build tank destroyers. Those tank destroyers were generally turretless vehicles built on a tank chassis, but with the fixed armament one size larger than that in the equivalent tank.

Some facts that would later become significant: the Soviet army of June 1945 got much of it’s mobility from hundreds of thousands of American-made Studebaker trucks which carried supplies and accompanying infantry for their armor. They also relied on American-supplied radios to coordinate that armor.

The armies and their tanks (June 1945)—Others:

Except for Yugoslavia, the new communist or communist-dominated states of Eastern Europe had very little independent military power, and with the exception of Czechoslovakia, little in the way of unique or interesting armor. They were ants in an elephant war, and they knew it. In Yugoslavia, Tito watched the progress of the Soviet offensive, building up his forces for a thrust into areas of Italy that the Yugoslavs had long claimed. That thrust would come only if the Soviets were successful. He also funneled supplies to the communist faction in the Greek civil war, siphoning off a cut to build up his own forces.

The Czechs benefited from being the last industrialized center in German hands. Czech factories built some of the latest German designs as late as April 1945. They had parts on hand, and finished building some partly completed German-designed vehicles in June 1945.

Czechoslovakia as a nation didn’t fight in World War II until the liberation battles of summer 1946. Czech-designed tanks were excellent though, and Germans made extensive use of captured Czech tanks in the early war years. They also continued production of one of them as the Panzer 38(t). When that design became obsolete as a tank, the Germans used slightly modified chassis as the basis for a series of light tank destroyers. The Czechs restarted production of one of those vehicles in July 1945. The Hetzer light tank destroyer, a 15-16 ton vehicle based on the Czech-designed Panzer 38(t) chassis had the same medium velocity 75-mm gun the Germans used in late model Panzer 4’s. Later in 1945, the Czechs also produced a heavier tank destroyer based on a slightly strengthened version of the same chassis. It was a copy of the German Jagdpanzer 38(d) tank destroyer and carried a Czech version of the high-velocity 75-mm gun mounted in the German Panther tanks.

The Czechs actually continued tank design with German blessing during the German occupation. They modified a prewar design into the Turan tanks produced by Hungary. They also did design work on concepts intended for German production. One of those designs, the T25, was Czechoslovakia’s answer to the T34, with well-sloped armor and a Czech-designed 75-mm gun. It was rejected by the Germans but provided the basis for the quick design of the Skoda T30, which covertly entered production in spring of 1946. (As a side-note, the Czechs also built small quantities of ME-262 clones, and used those copies of the famous German jet for a time during late 1945 and early 1946.)

In Asia, the Japanese were still a major military power, but they lacked the manufacturing or resource base to put their late-war designs into large-scale production. Japanese tank production was very limited in the time period covered by this paper. The reasonably good Medium tank Type 3 CHI-NU made it to small-scale production. It was in the same general class as early model Shermans. Armor was lighter, but the main armament was comparable. A few Medium tanks Type 4, Chi-To were produced in early 1946. They were comparable to later Shermans, with a high-velocity 75-mm gun and good armor. The Medium tank Type 5 CHI-RI never made it past prototype stage. It was larger than the Type 4, but had the same main armament.

The Nationalist Chinese were gradually rearmed with American tanks, but those tanks were still few and were often stockpiled for the inevitable civil war with the communists. The Chinese communists had very little armor. They also quietly entered into a truce with the Japanese in June 1945. That truce freed up Japanese units and made defeating the Japanese significantly harder for the US and Nationalist Chinese.

Armor developments in 1945 and 1946--Western Allies:

United States: The US discovered that Shermans and T34/85s were evenly matched. Shermans with the 76mm gun could knock out T34/85s at normal combat ranges, especially when using tungsten-cored ammunition. The T34/85’s 85mm gun was also quite capable of knocking out a Sherman. Unfortunately, the Sherman was not capable of handling the heavier Soviet armor. A JS-2 or 3 was out of the Sherman’s class.

US tankers had already been clamoring for more heavily armed tanks. When they encountered the Soviet heavy armor, that clamoring got much louder. The military responded by shipping every 90mm-armed tank or tank destroyer they could get their hands on. They even shipped 30 limited production T25’s, a more mobile but less heavily armored sister of the Pershing. That tank proved very useful and eventually went into limited production as the M25 Black Jack. Pershing production in the month of June 1945 was 400 tanks. By September 1945, monthly Pershing production was more than twice that, and the US had produced over 3000 Pershings.

The M25 Black Jack went into mass production in August 1945, and eventually surpassed Pershing production. It compensated for its lighter armor by being much more mobile.

The US also continued Sherman production until October 1945, and remanufacturing of Shermans continued into mid-1946. In the desperate days of June and July 1945, as the Soviet push across Germany seemed unstoppable, the US agreed to rebuild several thousand worn-out 75mm gun Shermans with the British 17-pounder, and to build a US version of that gun. The 17-pounder was in short supply, so those tanks didn’t reach the troops until October, after Allied lines had stabilized, but they were still very welcome. As mentioned earlier, unofficial re-equipment of US units with Sherman Fireflys started much earlier, and was often condoned or encouraged by commanders on the ground in Europe.

The US considered putting the same 90mm gun that was used in the Pershing in new Shermans, and from a logistics standpoint, they probably should have done that, but the 17-pounder solution was already in production in Britain, and could be implemented more quickly. In the crisis of late June 1945, speed was vital.

That crisis atmosphere led to some other less than perfect decisions. The US rushed the Super-Pershing—a Pershing with a long-barreled, higher velocity 90mm gun into service as quickly as possible. The new 90mm gun was roughly equivalent to the high velocity 88mm gun in a King Tiger, so the extra firepower was welcome. Unfortunately, the ammunition for it was unwieldy and the rate of fire was low.

For the longer term, the US accelerated production plans for a true American heavy tank. One such tank, the T29, was already slated for mass production in June 1945. In late 1945 the T29 was renamed the M29 and entered service, giving morale of US tankers a major boost. The M29 was formidable, even by Soviet standards. It weighed over 65 tons—about as much as a King Tiger. Its high velocity 105-mm gun shot a 24.6 pound hypervelocity armor piercing (HVAP) shot with a muzzle velocity of over 3500 feet per second. Hull armor was no thicker than a Pershing’s, but was more effectively laid out, and turret armor was up to 175mm thick. An even more heavily armored tank arrived in mid-1946. The M32 Assault Tank carried a high-velocity 90-mm gun, and had armor close to 300mm thick on parts of the turret.

The US finally emphasized tank firepower. Even Hellcat tank destroyers got a 90mm gun version, though the gun was really too large for the vehicle. The 75mm gun Sherman vanished from US forces in Europe, though it lingered on in allied armies and in US forces in the Pacific.

Britain: The British responded to the heavy Soviet armor by upgrading the remainder of their 75 mm gun Shermans to Firefly standards, by increasing production of the Comet, and by putting a 20-pounder (84mm) on the Centurian.

The British also had to deal with the Greek Civil War. American Lend Lease M24 light tanks proved useful in that conflict. Their light weight allowed them to get places in the mountainous Greek terrain where other tanks couldn’t go. The British took as many as the US was willing to give.

France: The initial Soviet assault by-passed the French occupation zone in Germany, as Stalin attempted to split the French from the western allies. That put the French in a dilemma. Their army was utterly dependent on US Lend-Lease dollars and equipment. On the other hand, their army was not ready to take on the Soviets, and the strong French communist party opposed getting involved.

The French walked that tight-rope for over a month, actually negotiating increased Lend Lease aid while staying technically neutral in the conflict. In some ways they were in a strong position because much of the British and US supply lines went through France. The French government reached an unwritten temporary agreement with the communists that supplies through France would not be interfered with as long as French troops did not take offensive action against the Soviets.

The French eventually did enter the war, and their forces quickly found that their older model Shermans were no match for the heavy Soviet tanks. The French tried desperately to revive French armor production. As a stopgap, pre-1940 era S35s and H39s lost their turrets and got large improvised super-structures containing 76mm guns or 17-pounders. French tracked personnel carriers were converted to carry 75mm guns. Later in 1945, the French began upgrading their Shermans with a French designed turret carrying a French 90mm gun. They also did small-scale production of a tank called the AML-44, based on the suspension of the pre-war B1-series of French tanks, but with a long-barreled 90mm gun in the turret.

The French actually assembled a few new Panther tanks, using stockpiled parts and manufacturing capacity in the French occupation zone. They also produced spare parts for captured Panthers in French service. The AML-46 that entered production in September 1946 is often considered a Panther clone—a bit unfairly. The AML-46 did have many Panther-like features, but it was simpler to manufacture, and its French-designed 90mm gun gave it the firepower of a King Tiger, though the armor was lighter.

Italy: Through the summer of 1945, as the Soviet offensive in Germany continued, Italy feared a joint Soviet/Yugoslav push into northern Italy. That offensive would have linked with leftist Italian partisans and threatened the government’s hold on the most industrial part of Italy. Fortunately, it didn’t happen. Tito wanted to grab parts of northern Italy, but he was wary of Stalin’s gamble in Germany. When it became apparent that the Soviets were not going to push the Allies off the continent, and especially after the first American use of the atomic bomb, Tito gradually took a more neutral position.

In late August 1945, with the Soviet offensive in Germany bogging down, the Soviets attempted a sweep from Austria through northern Italy and into southern France. Tito’s failure to join in that offensive earned him Stalin’s enmity, and may have led to one or more assassination attempts. The Italians tried desperately to stay out of the war in June and July of 1945, while building up their armed forces. Most Italian war material came from the British or US, but the Italians did restart production of the self-propelled Semovente guns and small-scale production of their P26/40 light medium tank.

The P26 was no match for the JS-2, or even the T34/85. Fortunately, the terrain in northern Italy made it difficult for the Soviets to use heavy tanks, especially given allied control of the air. The fighting did make new tank designs a high priority for the Italians, but new Italian-designed tanks didn’t become available until early 1947. In the interim, the Italians did up gun the P26, using the British 17-pounder in a new turret.

Armor developments in 1945 and 1946—The Soviets

The initial Soviet offensive made heavy use of Sherman tanks as a deception measure. That became less effective as spare parts ran out, and as allied troops learned to spot Soviet Shermans. That was possible because Soviet Shermans were primarily M4A2’s with slight external differences from other Shermans.

The initial Soviet offensive failed to push the western allies into the sea more because of logistics and morale limitations and allied airpower. Their tanks performed well, though the slow rate of fire and low ammunition storage capacity of the JS-2 and JS-3 heavy tanks were especially highlighted in the city fighting around allied pockets on the east side of the Rhine.

The logistics limitations became increasingly severe as the war went on, as spare parts for the American-built trucks that gave the Soviets much of their mobility ran out.

The Soviets were justly proud of their production accomplishments during their war with Germany, and had long refused to acknowledge any dependence on the US for their war effort. Now the dependencies became apparent. US-supplied trucks and locomotives broke down and couldn’t be repaired. Tank engine production became harder without US-supplied aluminum. Specialized petroleum products that had been refined in the US became unavailable—including high-octane aviation fuel. Food became even scarcer in Soviet-held territory, and weakened populations fell victim to a variety of diseases. Without US-supplied DDT, typhus killed millions, just as it had after World War I. US anti-biotics might have stopped some of the natural and man-made epidemics that so devastated Soviet and other eastern European populations in the last part of World War II.

In depth discussion of the impact of disease is beyond the scope of this paper. The issue of whether Soviet germ warfare efforts gone awry or mutations stemming from US use of atomic weapons were primarily responsible for the epidemics is still so politically charged as to be impossible to resolve, though our knowledge of genetics should make the issue clear.

In terms strictly of their armor, the Soviets continued to make simple, robust tanks. The T44 became increasingly common, as did the JS-3. A new version of the T44 called the T44/100 arrived. It carried a good 100-mm gun.

As they were forced onto the defensive, the Soviets preserved their tanks whenever possible, pitting inexpensive light self-propelled anti-tank guns against allied armor. The Soviets also diverted armored chassis for use as mobile carriers for the Soviet version of the V2, and Soviet follow-ons to that missile. Whether that was an effective use of the armor is debatable, but Soviet guided missiles did divert a great deal of allied airpower. They also had an impact on allied morale far beyond the physical damage they did, especially when they were armed with chemical weapons.

 

Armor developments in 1945 and 1946--Others:

In the second half of 1946, Poles, Czechs, Romanians and Ukrainians played a role in the war, as the allies fought their way through Central and Eastern Europe. Usually that role was a mixture of insurrection behind the Soviet lines, and exile forces operating with the allies. This aspect of the campaign produced little that was unique in the way of armor or tactics. The Czechs continued to produce variants of their Hetzer tank destroyer. As noted earlier, they also covertly produced small quantities of the Skoda S30 light-medium tank starting in early spring 1946. The Czechs began designing their excellent late war series of tanks after their liberation in the summer of 1946, but those tanks didn’t reach Czech troops until very late in 1947.

With the opening of the Burma Road route to China, the Nationalist Chinese received large numbers of US-built tanks. Some of those tanks were stockpiled for use against the Communists, but the Nationalists did use many of them against Japan. The Chinese defeat of Japanese forces in China was primarily an infantry operation though. The Japanese were overwhelmed by poorly trained, but well armed Chinese Nationalist troops.

In the Pacific, the Japanese could barely cope with Sherman tanks. Once the US could spare Pershings from the European theatre, there was little the Japanese could do against US armor beyond infantry suicide tactics. Those tactics were used extensively in the Philippines, Dutch West Indies, and French Indochina.

 

Conclusions—The Role of Armor from June 1945 to December 1946:

Armor played a key role in the course of the war during this period. The initial Soviet advantage in armored firepower let them capture the bulk of the US and British occupation zones in Germany within the first three weeks of the war. Allied armor played a key role in the stubborn defense of bypassed German towns and transportation hubs by US and British units. The fact that many of those pockets could hold out for a prolonged period was due to Allied air resupply efforts, but trapped Shermans and M36s played a key role in holding the Soviets away from the airports and making that resupply effort possible.

The bravery of the American tankers who pitted their 75mm gun armed Shermans against JS-3s was extraordinary. The fact that they fought on in so many cases, even when cut off and outnumbered played a key role in slowing the Soviet advance long enough for Allied airforces to recover from the initial Soviet air strikes on Allied runways. Yes, US and British airpower destroyed a lot of Soviet tanks, but the Allies held bridgeheads across the Rhine and the coastal enclaves throughout the early months of the war mainly through the efforts of US ground forces, with armor playing a major role.

US ground forces performed poorly in the first week of the Soviet attack. They were caught by surprise and were inferior in armored firepower. Fleeing German civilians also played a role by hampering allied movements.

After the Soviet gains of the first week, the key question became how much of the allied armies would be able to avoid being trapped in Germany east of the Rhine. The Soviet effort to diplomatically isolate France from the other Allies backfired to some extent, as key units that otherwise would have been trapped were able to reach defensible positions. By early July it became clear that the Soviets were not going to win the war on the eastern side of the Rhine. It became imperative that they wipe out Allied bridgeheads on the east side of the Rhine and establish beachheads on the west side of the Rhine before allied defenses to consolidated.

Soviet logistics were already tenuous when they reached the Rhine. Their US-built trucks had short life spans in the hands of Soviet drivers and mechanics. As the offensive began, they broke down in very large numbers. Spare parts were used up and Soviet mobility nose-dived. The Soviets commandeered any motor vehicle that they could get their hands on to keep the offensive moving. There wasn’t much to commandeer. People with usable vehicles had used them to get out of the path of the Soviets.

Getting troops and supplies to the front lines became a major challenge, especially as US planes targeted trucks. The German rail network was still devastated from allied attacks, and the remnants got hit hard by allied air power. Soviet logistics problems were worsened by pockets of allied troops holding out in key transportation centers. The allies mobilized every available transport plane to supply those pockets.

In spite of their logistics problems, the Soviets established beachheads across the Rhine River. They concentrated forces in those bridgeheads, and watched Allied carpet-bombing turn those areas into graveyards for Soviet armor.

At that point, the Soviets still had a chance to push the allies off the continent. They had to do it soon though. The US and the British together had a large production advantage over the Soviets, and unlike the Germans, the Soviets did not have technical superiority. Allied armor was just good enough to turn the war from a Soviet Blitz to a war of production. The Soviets could not win that war.

Lingering Controversies:

The role of German Nationalists: As the Soviet offensive began, Germans of all political persuasions appealed to the allies to defend them or let them defend themselves. In some areas German ex-soldiers escaped or were released from allied POW camps and tried to defend German civilians against the Soviet army. At times they used abandoned allied equipment. The Soviets used cases like that to bolster their propaganda line that allies had rearmed Germany for an attack on the Soviet Union.

In several cases, besieged allied soldiers did fight alongside German civilians. That kind of collaboration went on around several German cities where remnants of allied forces held out.

German Nationalists claim a major role for those efforts in slowing down the Soviet offensive. They also claim that Germans could have played a much larger role had they been allowed to rearm on an official rather than an unofficial basis. The Western Allies point out that the Soviet army became much more enthusiastic when they were facing Germans, and claim that any minor material good the Germans did was far outweighed by the positive impact that fighting Germans had on Soviet morale. That is a lingering controversy. It is also beyond the scope of this paper.

For the purposes of this paper, the only real question is the extent to which German soldiers used and modified Allied and German-built tanks during their resistance efforts. German resistance fighters did use abandoned Shermans, sometimes in odd combinations, like the German-manned Sherman tanks armed with high velocity 75mm guns salvaged from derelict Panthers. Such efforts played a minor role in stopping the Soviets, not the primary one claimed by extreme German Nationalists. Actually, the fiercest fighting between the Soviets and irregular units in Germany was between the Soviets and men of various Soviet nationalities who had served in the German army. Those men fought desperately to avoid being captured. Thousands of Cossacks who had served with the Germans also played a pivotal role in Italy in August 1945.

Ukrainian, Polish and Baltic irregular forces have as much right to claim a role in stopping the Soviets as do German partisans. The Ukrainian UPA did make the bad Soviet logistics situation worse with its guerrilla raids.

The role of French communists: Was the leadership of the French Communist party planning a coup in early July 1945? How committed to the Soviet cause were French communists? The French communists had weapons hidden away from their days as part of the resistance. The fact that most of the rank-and-file of the communist party reacted as Frenchmen rather than communists rendered those weapons of little consequence. Some communists did fight the French government in early July 1945, and those battles produced some interesting armored matchups—French government manned Panthers versus communist-manned FT17s and R35s for example, but the fighting was not wide-spread or influential in terms of the overall war.