Robert Alley: I like the way you picked up some of my scenario seeds and ran with them, especially the New Madrid earthquake and Norwegian scenarios.

On the multiple microcomputer lines scenario, I was visualizing something like the situation in the mini-computer market in the early to mid 80's, with seven or eight reasonably major companies dueling it out and only as much intercommunication between brands as the customers demanded. I could see each of the major mainframe and mini-computer manufacturers extending one or more of their product lines downward so that current customers could get a microcomputer that easily fit into their existing infrastructure. I believe that DEC actually tried that, with three of their divisions coming out with “PCs” that fit easily into their architectures. I believe that Burroughs brought out a cut-down, microprocessor-based version of their mainframe architecture. IBM did something similar with the AS/400, though the smaller versions of the AS/400 never pushed too deep into PC territory.

I could see the existing mainframe and mini-computer manufacturers trying to keep their lock on existing customers by pushing existing architectures into lower price ranges, while the likes of Apple, Commodore, Tandy, NorthStar, and the various S100 bus/CPM and S50 bus companies went primarily after businesses too small to have previously computerized, or very autonomous departments of larger companies. Companies would give their customers as little inter-interoperability as they could get away with. A separate home market might be more viable in those circumstances because there wouldn't be a predominant standard at the workplace.

I would probably take the marketing of the IBM PC as a point of divergence. In the long term, IBM lost control of large segments of its market by marketing the PC. If IBM had decided to do a DEC-style proprietary approach, they would not have had the early lead in microcomputers that they enjoyed, but they also would not have lost control of a lot of their core customers. The microcomputer market would probably not have grown as fast as it did because IBM would have been exerting all of it's considerable influence to push it's proprietary systems. As to what those computers would have looked like, one possible candidate would have been the “lab computer” that IBM actually did market shortly after they brought out the PC. It was based on the Motorola 68000 and a proprietary IBM operating system and cost a little under $10,000 fully equipped. IBM actually came out with a cheaper business-oriented version at one point, but by that time the PC had taken off and it had little impact.

Don't get me started on software patents. I see no value to them except as a method for established companies to sue entrepreneurial competitors out of existence, and I see no public policy benefit to lending the legal system to that. The likes of Apple, Microsoft, and other major companies couldn't have come into existence under the current system, and the 2005 would-be equivalents of those companies can't come into existence under a software patent regime. Patents are absurd for software and extremely counterproductive from a public policy standpoint. Okay. I'm going to stop now.

After I made my comments on animal intelligence last issue, I remembered a thought I had quite some time ago. Animals life strategies can be categorized along a line. Near one end of that line you have the cockroach strategy: live a short life but have enough offspring that nothing is likely to kill them all. On the other end of that line you have the elephant strategy: have a very long life, but few offspring. Most animals obviously fall between those two extremes. Each of those strategies has implications for animal intelligence. Cockroaches adapt to changing conditions by cranking out a lot of cockroaches, a few of which are likely to be adapted to any new set of conditions they encounter. Elephants can’t do that. Individual elephants have to be able to adapt to change during their lifespan.

In computer terms, a cockroach can have the equivalent of a set of highly optimized ROM routines built in that cover the situations that they are likely to encounter. New situations are met by building a new cockroach with a slightly modified ROM. A cockroach only needs enough processing power to choose between the sets of ROM routines, and very little memory storage capacity.

Elephants can’t build a new elephant every time something changes in the environment. In computer terms it needs a much more powerful processing unit, much more long-term storage, and it needs to keep many of its behavior routines in RAM so that they can be modified. It also needs sophisticated routines to modify those behavior routines.

The point of all of this is that a long-lived animal with few off-spring in a highly variable environment has to be more intelligent than its shorter-lived competitors. That doesn’t necessarily make it superior to those shorter-lived competitors. It’s just a different way to cope with life. Cockroach-type species actually tend to survive extremely drastic or catastrophic changes better than even the smartest elephant-type species. Elephant-type species tend to out-compete cockroach-type species when changes are less drastic or can be dealt with by changing behavior. So, if you’re looking for intelligence, look for long life-span, a variable environment, and few offspring.

Dale Cozort: I obviously got bogged down on my “Siberian Connection” scenario, and for some reason the “France Fights On From North Africa” scenario isn't going anywhere. Other than that I'm pretty happy with last issue

Tom Cron: I’m glad you enjoyed the comic universes matchups. On your speculations: I toyed with the idea of Spain colonizing Australia a few issues ago. I should go back and actually follow through on that. If Daladier got rid of Gamelin, he would probably replace him with Weygand as he did historically. Weygand would certainly be a better commander. Gamelin was brilliant and would have made an excellent staff officer but he was a disastrous commander, more concerned with avoiding responsibility for decisions than with making them quickly and decisively. That being said, I doubt that Weygand could have avoided a French defeat in 1940. He would have probably done some things right, including ditching the Breda variant which sent half of France’s Central front reserves across Belgium and into Holland—about as far away from the decisive front as they could have been sent. Having a French light armored division, two motorized divisions, five high-quality infantry divisions, and two independent tank battalions at the decisive point on May 13 or May 14 would have made the German task much harder. On the other hand, the Germans were much better at concentrating tanks and aircraft at the decisive point. They also got to choose where the decisive point was.

Almost as important, the French had to rush to Belgium’s rescue when the Germans went in. That tied up France’s most mobile forces for the first week or so of the campaign. Belgium also contributed heavily to the Allied defeat in May 1940, by withdrawing from the Ardennes essentially without a fight, which opened up the French flank as they went into Belgium, by losing key fortresses with surprisingly little fight and later by surrendering on short notice, leaving the French and British forces that had come to their rescue in an untenable situation.

Anthony Docimo: Nice first page. I may see the rest of it next issue. Oh wait there is AnOther entry from you later in the zine. I’m glad you like the idea of dogs being domesticated in South America first. Feel free to run with it. On Magic and Religion: Darl knows what his evil twin is going to do because this is all part of a plan that he thought of too, but at the crucial moment (killing his friend) backed off from. At the end of the story Darl lives. Darl Junior dies. On Mars: think typical Old South American herbivores. I’m pretty sure I mentioned some of them—large Capybara-relative rodents, the horse-like South American ungulates. I’ll have to go back and make sure I put in enough prey species mentions. Can’t have my predators starving to death. The monkeys are an off-shoot of spider monkeys that didn’t develop quite as fully into intelligent beings our time-line. Ward doesn’t know anything that I don’t know, which means there’s an awful lot he doesn’t know. General Atomics, however, knows all. Re clearcuts: okay now. Under the Kyoto Accords does Turkey have to account for your contribution to global warming or do we?

On the potential for European invasions of the Ottoman Empire: the balance of power wasn’t at all favorable to that until the late 1600s or early 1700s. After that the Europeans seriously ate away at the fringes of Ottoman territory. I think that the three-way rivalry between Austria, Russia and Prussia kept the inroads from being more serious sooner than they were, along with the fact that Britain preferred to have the Balkans in weak Ottoman hands rather than strong Russian ones. If Poland had been stronger or Prussia weaker, I suspect that Russia and Austria would have munched much more of the European part of the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 1700s. As I recall it, the first partition of Poland originated after Austria and Russia defeated the Ottomans and were going to carve off some chunks. That would have upset the balance of power with Prussia, so after some negotiations, each power sliced off a hunk of Poland instead of taking their booty from the Ottomans.

Mark Ford: Sorry to hear about the lost elections and the car accident. Good to have you back. I enjoyed your efforts to produce the AH behind the cover picture. I think just getting all three of them in the picture is difficult enough, much less switching countries to match the position in the picture. You did give it a good try though.

David Freitag: I enjoyed your “Successful Revolts” section, especially the one on Pugachev. I also enjoyed your review of Conquistador. I enjoyed the book, but you're right about it not having much AH content.

James E. Fulkerson: More please. I was getting into your story.

Robert Gill: A longer life for Samuel Clemens? That's an interesting idea. Famous writers and celebrities can have an influence far beyond their fields. On your scenario where the US declines as a global power after the fall of the Soviet Union: As much as I hate to say this, that's sort of in the process of happening. If you look at just about any measure of military power—number of army divisions, planes, nuclear missiles, and especially ships in the navy—US military power went into steep decline not long after the Gulf War. We've built back a little in the last three years, but nowhere close to where we were. The reality is that at the height of the Cold War we were geared up to fight the Soviets and the Chinese at the same time. Now we would be hard pressed to fight North Korea as long as we're tied up in Iraq.

In several ways the fall of the Soviet Union automatically reduced US power relative to potential rivals:

It increased the deployable power of every country bordering or threatened by the Soviet Union. For example, while the Soviet Union existed the Chinese had to deploy a large portion of their most modern military equipment in Manchuria to guard against a Soviet invasion. Iran had to keep their guard up against such an invasion too. That meant that both countries had fewer military options to the south. It also meant that there were limits to how hostile they could become to the US, because if the Soviets decided to invade, either country would have needed US support.

It decreased US leverage over the Allies. With the Soviets hovering over Western Europe, the likes of France could be and were obstinate, but ultimately they depended on the US military to keep the Soviets out, and that meant that there were limits to the amount of hostility that could develop. If the Europeans became too openly hostile to the US, it might jeopardize the US defense guarantees, so a lot of differences got papered over during the Cold War. When the Soviets fell, it was no longer necessary for those differences to be papered over, and they've become increasingly obvious and bitter.

It decreased the US advantage over other countries as a destination for capital. Throughout the Cold War, investing in Western Europe carried an added risk compared to investing in the US. If the Cold War turned hot, the US and the Soviet Union might get devastated. Western Europe certainly would. When the Soviet Union collapsed, investing in Europe no longer carried the risk of having your property end up in the middle of a conventional large-scale shooting war. That made Europe more attractive to investors compared to the US.

It reduced US military production capability. When the Soviet Union collapsed, suddenly the US needed a lot less of most weapons. We had plenty of tanks, planes, and most types of missiles for a world with no Soviet Union. It would have been wasteful to buy more, so in the early to mid-90's the US virtually stopped buying whole categories of weapons and spare parts. Defense contractors have to pay workers just like any other company, so with reduced orders they cut back. The Defense Department tried to manage the shrinking of the defense industrial base, but by the late 90's when we had worked through a lot of the Cold War surplus, a lot of key defense contractors were either gone, in other lines of business, or considerably smaller than they needed to be in order to meet current defense needs. In the summer of 2001, I remember reading an article talking about the desperate shortage of spare parts in the navy. Aircraft carriers were meeting each other at sea and stripping parts off of perfectly good aircraft so that the outgoing carrier could have flyable aircraft. In some cases, suppliers just weren’t there anymore. We’ve built back somewhat since then, but we’ve also flown the wings off of planes and driven the wheels and tracks off of trucks and tanks. That’s stressing our post-Cold War production capacity.

If a country doesn't build any of something for nearly ten years, that country doesn't automatically still have the capacity to build. For example, it has been over ten years since the US has built a main battle tank—at least for the US army. It has been approximately fifteen years since we've built a nuclear weapon. The skilled work forces needed to do those things has gone elsewhere, retired or even died. There has been no incentive to train replacements. In some areas, equipment has been sold off or scrapped, and factories converted to building something there is actually demand for. I don't foresee us needing more nukes or more main battle tanks in the near future, but if we did it would take years to rebuild the industrial base enough to make large quantities of them. This extends to simple things like rifle bullets. We ran short of bullets not long ago because of the demands of Iraq and training people for Iraq. We had to buy large quantities from Israel and South Korea, as well as dipping into war reserves. We’re getting more capacity on-line now, but even for something like that it isn’t like flipping a switch to increase production.

It increased the tendency of other powers to consider us a potential enemy. There is a natural tendency for countries to band together against a country that is considered too dominant. We are increasingly seen as a potential threat around the world. That’s inevitable given our military power and the lack of a viable counterbalance. Historically, the second, third, and if necessary fourth most powerful countries tend to gravitate toward an alliance against the strongest. That doesn’t always happen, but it usually does, even if the long-term interests of the powers banding together are incompatible.

None of this is to say that we were better off with the Soviets around, or that the US is going to collapse as a major power anytime soon. I think though, that we’ll see a pattern where regional powers gradually become stronger relative to the United States and eventually become too strong for us to challenge them on their own turf—at least not unless our vital national interests are at stake. China is already probably in that position, and possibly India—at least in terms of a non-nuclear land invasion. I find it difficult to imagine the US successfully invading either country. There may come a time when Iran is also in that position. We’ll also see countries with great power aspirations temporarily putting aside their differences to oppose us or to build up some third party with the potential to be a thorn in our side.

I know that there is a ban on current political discussion in the APA, but none of this is all that related to who is in charge of the US. It’s pretty much inevitable in the long term, though a particularly good or bad president can slow down or accelerate the process.

I enjoyed your “Those Who Died Early” and “Those Who Didn't Die Soon Enough” segments. For the most part very true.

David Johnson: I sympathize about the computer replacement fiasco. I'm running two small computer labs (12 and 20 computers) as a volunteer for the school my daughter goes to. Most of the computers in the labs are PIIs or PIIIs, with half a dozen K6s still soldiering on. The K6s are about ready for a mass meltdown. The fans in the power supplies have been failing one after another. The power supplies themselves don't fail immediately, but they run hot all of the time, and that eventually causes them to fail. Then, since we're talking AT motherboards rather than ATX ones, I have a choice of putting a salvaged power supply in and hoping it doesn't fail in a week or two, or just stripping everything usable out of the computer and trying to build up a replacement out of spare and salvaged parts.

Of course finding drivers and documentation for these things is also lots of fun, as is trying to keep the network running when you’re using computers like that. Your response to Gill: I have had that same feeling about the students using my networks. Your response to Nuttall: Good point about the implications of Trek tech in terms of computers and mining. Your comments to me: Good points on vacuum pumps in an iron-age tech base and on the Martians taking over the moon. I'll have to think about that. I think I fixed the worst of the problems you had with the scene in Char where they found Dawn in the trunk. Thanks for emphasizing the problems with that scene. Thanks also for looking at the ending. The version of the ending you see in this issue will correct some of the problems you saw.

I have to agree with your take on the Marvel/DC heroes and villains match-up, though it does take a lot of the fun out of the whole thing. How about a ‘toon match-up: Disney versus Warner Bros? I think Warner Bros would kick butt.

Wesley Kawato: So, the saga of John Gordon is coming to an end. I'll be interested in seeing where you go from there.

Gerson Lodi Ribeiro: Glad to hear that you are actually making money from science fiction. You're right. It feels like it's worth more than money earned through the day job. Your comments to Docimo: Intelligent dinosaurs with a moon-base. Sounds like a fun time-line. Have the stories been translated into English? If so, they might fit into a little project of mine. Your comments to me: Sorry about the missing segment of Char. Hopefully last issue made up for it. On Mars Looks different: You are right that the space scene drags out too long. I'll have to figure out a way of fixing that. You're also right about the adviser having too much access to President Baker. I'll have to fix that.

Your comments to me in issue 40. As you know by now, that wasn’t quite the end of Char. I’m sorry my comments at the beginning of the issue misled you.

Spreading the stories over so many issues over so many months has its disadvantages, among which are that people forget details mentioned earlier. I also make little changes that are in my manuscript but not in the version you saw. For example I’m pretty sure I established in the first or second installment of Char that Rick is something of a weight-lifter. I do in the current version. I think (I hope—I’ll look and make sure) that I also mentioned that Venus in the Mars time-line has a day-night cycle similar to earth’s. As you know by now, Dawn did die, and one of the policemen was paralyzed. You are right about kicking the door instead of hitting it with one’s shoulder. I’ll change that. I’m glad you enjoyed Char overall. I hope you like the real ending better than the apparent one.

On intelligent animals: see my comments to Alley. I’ve corresponded with Eric Henriet from time to time and he seems very knowledgeable. He would like to get as complete as possible a set of POD back issues, and I would like to see him have them. Somehow we’ve just never managed to get that done. It’s not entirely my call anyway.

Christopher Nuttall: Sorry you couldn’t make it for this issue. I enjoyed the zines you did do.

Jim Rittenhouse: Nice seeing you in these pages again, and with a space-related time-line too no less. Very cool. A time-line that puts MacNamara where he arguably can cause less damage. Even better. One without a space shuttle or a Watergate scandal. Again, very good. Now for the nitpicks. First, I'm not at all sure that a Kennedy administration, even with a more savvy head of DOD, would find a way out of Vietnam without a war. While many US conservatives thought that Vietnam was the wrong war to be fighting early on, Republicans wouldn't let a Democratic president off the hook for 'losing' Vietnam, and Kennedy knew that. The Vietnam War didn't look all that unwinnable in early 1963 anyway.

There was also the Diem factor. I doubt that he would go along with anything acceptable to the North Vietnamese, and getting rid of him might lead to the same circus of coups and counter-coups that historically led South Vietnam to near collapse in late 1963 and 1964.

Second, if Kennedy didn't allow the Bay of Pigs invasion to proceed, you get several negative affects as well as the positive ones. First, what does the US do with several thousand trained and equipped Cuban exiles? They'll probably be a thorn in the Kennedy administrations side for quite some time. Also, the US and especially the CIA would not have gotten a sharp lesson in the consequences of over-reaching. As to the Cuban missile crisis, I'm not sure that getting rid of the Bay of Pigs and the US short-range missiles would have necessarily avoided that crisis. Castro was young and reckless at the time, while Krushchev was impetuous and had a lot to gain strategically if he could get nukes in a position to threaten the US.

Third, I'm not at all sure that the Khmer Rouge would take power in Cambodia in this scenario at any point. Were they strong enough to gain power in the absence of a US-backed military coup and invasion of Cambodia?

Fourth, I think it's inevitable that the US will pressure European governments to abandon programs that compete with US space programs to some extent. Money buys governmental influence in any administration, Kennedy or Johnson, Republican or Democrat.

Overall, this is not bad at all, but you tiptoe to the edge of turning it into an “if only” scenario rather than a “what-if” scenario at points. For example, in real life jerks like Johnson and Hoover usually don't go out without taking a lot of good people with them. Also, in real life, good people make what in retrospect seem like stupid decisions, and Kennedy/Symington would have had to make a lot of tough calls. How do you stay out of a huge commitment to Vietnam without encouraging a slew of other would be National Liberation Fronts and appearing weak? How do you react to the Soviet push to establish parity in nuclear missiles with the US? With anti-missile defenses? With more ballistic missiles? How do you handle Hoover without ruining the careers of a lot of your political allies and without getting accused of covering for those allies. How do you get social justice in the southern US without triggering a mass exodus of the southern Democrats that are the main force behind segregation, but are also necessary to keep the Democrats competitive in the House and Senate? Those are all tough issues, and in many cases they didn't have a right answer, just one with less of a downside.

None of these nitpicks should be taken as meaning that I don’t like the piece. I do, a lot. Please continue.