Vladimir
Lenin died
of a stoke (3rd of a series) in 1924 at age 53. How does the Soviet
Union develop if he avoids the strokes and lives a substantial number
of extra years--at least 5 more and up to 20 (or at least has a
natural lifespan that long--death by violent means in some intraparty
dispute is a fairly possible outcome).
Lenin was a workaholic
and didn't know when or how to rest, so while 5 to 15 additional
years seems reasonable, twenty is pushing it and more than that seems
unlikely. Feel free to pick your year of death within those
parameters.
How does the Soviet Union develop with Lenin in
control for the additional years? What impact does that have on
developments up until World War II in OTL?
It
would be
interesting to see how the Lenin/Stalin relationship played out.
Stalin had amassed considerable power in terms of the party apparatus
even before Lenin died. On the other hand, Lenin had immense prestige
within the party, and he was made of considerably sterner stuff than
the other Old Bolsheviks.
I suspect that Stalin would have
moved more cautiously if Lenin had been in good health and
continuously involved in the party apparatus than he did with Lenin
in poor health and out of the process for periods of time in his
first two strokes. However, Lenin was a strong personality and
historically figured out Stalin. I suspect he would spot the threat
from Stalin and act against him. I suspect he would win that battle
and oust Stalin from his positions of power. On the other hand,
Stalin was a master of maneuver and timing. I wouldn't totally count
him out, even against Lenin.
A
lot depends on how
long Lenin survives past his real history expiration date. I suspect
that surviving long enough to denounce Stalin and then folding in the
mid-1920s would favor Trotsky. Staying on longer might end up pushing
succession to a younger generation of leaders.
Issues:
Historically the Soviet Union faced a variety of questions like
(1)
Was it going to become a federation with some degree of real power in
the hands of the SSRs or was it going to become the centralized state
that it historically became? There were strong forces for
centralization. The Russians were used to being in charge of a
centralized state and had the bulk of the administrative experience,
so there was a strong tendency toward "Great Russian
Chauvinism", which I believe Lenin was smart enough to spot and
fight against.
(2) Was the NEP going to continue or were they
going to go to the panic industrialization based around heavy
industry that they went to historically? The NEP was sort of a way
for the Bolsheviks to have their version of a capitalist period and
accumulate capital, but they didn't want the capitalist elements
encouraged by it to get strong enough that they took over the country
like they seem to be doing in China. The intention of at least part
of the Bolshevik leadership was that at some point the NEP would end
and the accumulated capital used to build Communism, which is kind of
what happened historically, though what got built was a distorted
fun-house mirror version.
Historically, there were divisions
among the leadership as to when and to a limited extent if that would
happen, with Stalin maneuvering between the factions. I'm guessing
that with Lenin in charge the same divisions would develop, but with
Lenin moderating the depth of the divisions because of his prestige
and power. If Trotsky succeeded Lenin in the mid-1920s, I suspect
that the NEP would be terminated as soon as he consolidated power,
and possibly a little earlier than it was historically.
Trotsky
supported the
concept of rapid industrialization at the expense of the peasants
early on, which is ironically, one of the things Stalin used against
him in the post-Lenin maneuverings. Stalin allied with the 'right'
(odd concept when talking about Bolsheviks) to get rid of Trotsky and
several other prominent 'leftists', then turned around and
implemented it. I'm not sure if it would have been implemented as
ruthlessly or effectively under someone other than Stalin.
Among
the issues: would Trotsky (or Lenin or someone else other than
Stalin) be willing to go to reactionary capitalists like Ford for
advice on building Soviet industry? Willingness to go to Capitalist
experts on mass production was a lot of what made Soviet
industrialization so successful, but it must have been a bitter thing
for the Soviet regime to accept.
But
would Trotsky
consolidate power? Historically, Stalin led the coalition
against Trotsky, but even without Stalin I suspect that there would
be an anti-Trotsky coalition, and that Trotsky would find few firm
allies near the top of the party.
A
guy I know who is
getting his doctorate in Russian history claims that Stalin's actions
were the logical endpoint for the Russian Revolution and that if they
hadn't been implemented by Stalin they would have been implemented by
whoever else was in charge.
I don't totally agree with that. I
don't think Lenin would have needed to unleash a reign of terror on
the Bolshevik party itself because unlike Stalin he had the
intellectual and oratorical firepower to dominate the old Bolsheviks.
I also don't think Lenin would feel the need to purge the Red Army to
the extent and in the way Stalin did, again because he would be more
secure in his position of power.
Other policies I'm not as
sure about. The end of the NEP? The forced heavy industrialization?
The war on the wealthy peasants? The elimination of any real power
from the non-Russian SSRs? The buildup of a powerful and ubiquitous
police state? I suspect that those were probably going to happen in
some form whoever was in charge of the Soviet Union, though the
timing, the extent, and the form they would take might differ
considerably under someone other than Stalin.
It would be
interesting to replay the lead-up to World War II with Lenin in
charge as opposed to Stalin. Stalin did a lot of things that were too
smart by half and that ended up backfiring on him. Hitler would never
have been in a position to launch his attack on the Soviet Union
without some of Stalin's dumber moves. Would Lenin have been smart
enough to realize that gaining a little chunk of rural Poland at the
expense of gaining Nazi Germany as a neighbor was a bad deal? Germany
could not have started World War II without a pact giving them access
to Soviet raw materials, or if they started it they couldn't have
sustained it long.
Granted,
no Soviet
leader would have trusted the West as potential strategic partners
after Munich, but I'm not at all sure cutting a deal did make sense,
even in the context of what the west did with Czechoslovakia. The
territory the Soviets gained in Poland was militarily a very mixed
blessing. They didn't have time to build up an infrastructure to
support their troops there, so when the Germans invaded the troops in
the occupied parts of Poland the Soviet troops there couldn't
adequately fight there and couldn't get out of the German pincers in
a timely manner.
The Soviets had more than two choices in
August 1939. Yes, signing on with the western Allies to help defend
Poland was risky because it is quite possible that Britain and France
would have sat back and let the Soviets do most if not all of the
heavy lifting. That doesn't mean that the Soviets had to make a pact
with the Germans that gave them the raw materials they needed to
fight the war. The most rational option would have been to shut up
and let the Germans wonder what the Soviets were going to do.
That
complicates German planning considerably. Are the Soviets going to
move in support of Poland? No way of knowing for sure from a German
point of view. Are the Soviets going to supply the Poles with
weapons? Again, no way of knowing. Maybe that deters the Germans.
Even if it doesn't, it keeps the Germans from building up enough to
cause the amount of destruction they did historically in the Soviet
Union. The Germans advanced into the Soviet Union in very large part
using Soviet oil and eating Soviet grain that Stalin traded to them.
Could not have done it without that.
Posted
on
Jan 4, 2012.
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